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The Roberts Court &
Executive Power
Jeffrey Rosen*
I am delighted to be here at Pepperdine where I know that all of my
questions about the mystery of the Roberts Court will be answered. Dean
Kmiec, in his kind introduction, said this is a Court of nine ruled by one.
And in cases involving executive power, this pattern holds. The views of
Justice Kennedy on executive power in the domestic and foreign spheres are
indeed defining the direction of the Roberts Court.
Broadly, we have four more conservative Justices who seem inclined to
defer to the executive branch not only in foreign affairs, but also in contested
interpretations of domestic statutes. Consider, for example, the
Massachusetts v. EPA' case, construing the EPA's power to regulate global
warming, 2 and the Gonzales v. Oregon3 case in which the Attorney General,
John Ashcroft, attempted to construe a federal law to prohibit doctors from
prescribing drugs to cause death in compliance with the Oregon "Death with
Dignity" law. n
In these foreign and domestic cases, there were four more liberal
Justices who were more skeptical of executive power, and they were
sometimes joined by Justice Kennedy who provided the important fifth
votes.' What is the source of Justice Kennedy's vision of executive power,
and how can his vision be distinguished from those of his more conservative
and liberal colleagues?
The answer may have something to do with the formative intellectual
and professional experiences of the Justices in question. For the four
conservatives, those formative experiences were shaped by what is now
called the theory of the unitary executive. It was, after all, in the post-
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1. 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007).
2. Id. at 1459.
3. 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
4. Id. at 248-49.
5. Id. at 247; see also Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. at 1444.
Watergate era that Justice Scalia, the head of the Office of Legal Counsel,6
and Vice President Cheney, then President Ford's Chief of Staff,7 became
suspicious of the excesses of what they perceived as congressional
oversight.8 They thought the presidential prerogatives were being usurped
and they became committed to defending the president's control over
domestic agencies against congressional assault.9 In the mid-1970s, Scalia,
Cheney, and other young conservatives were alarmed by the War Powers
Resolution and other laws that the post-Watergate Congress had passed to
constrain the President."' They were particularly distressed when Congress
voted to cut off funding for South Vietnam in 1975, which they felt
undermined President Ford's foreign policy." When Cheney went on to
serve as a Republican congressman from Wyoming in the 1980s, the Iran-
Contra scandal reinforced his determination to defend executive power. ' 2 In
the minority report to the Iran-Contra hearings, Cheney and his aide David
Addington argued that most of what President Reagan did during the scandal
was legal. 13
During the Reagan administration, a group of younger conservatives,
which included Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, at the Office of
Legal Counsel ("OLC") and the White House Counsel's Office, asserted a
theory of the unitary executive which said that the President had to have the
power to fire any executive officer. 14 Under the leadership of Ted Olson
and Charles Cooper, with the help of deputies like Alito, the OLC
vigorously asserted the constitutional powers of the unitary executive. 15
6. The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/
biographiescurrent.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2008).
7. Biography of Vice President Richard B. Cheney, http://www.whitehouse.gov/
vicepresident/vpbio.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2008).
8. See, e.g., JAMES B. STAAB, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA 11-12
(2006) (quoting Justice Scalia in 1976: "While I question neither the legitimacy nor the desirability
of the congressional oversight function,... it should, in my view, be subordinate to the function of
legislating. You might ask yourselves when you read the daily newspapers how many of the
congressional activities which are reported pertain to the difficult and politically risky process of
hammering out specific and detailed legislative proposals, and how many consist of much more
scintillating inquiries into alleged executive malfeasance or inefficiency ..
9. See id. at 9-13.
10. See Scott Shane, Recent Flexing of Presidential Powers Had Personal Roots in Ford White
House, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2006, at A13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/
12/30/washington/30roots.html.
11. See Jane Mayer, The Hidden Power: The Legal Mind Behind the White House's War on
Terror, THE NEW YORKER, July 3, 2006, available at http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2006/07/
03/060703fafact I.
12. See id; see also Shane, supra note 10.
13. See Shane, supra note 10.
14. See Jeffrey Rosen, Power of One, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 24, 2006, at 8.
15. See id.
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Steven Calabresi, an assistant to Attorney General Ed Meese, was the
first to defend the idea of the "unitary executive" in a law review article in
1992.16 The initial goal of the unitary executive theory was to assert the
President's complete control over the executive branch in the face of assaults
by a Democratic Congress-in particular the Independent Counsel Act,
which unitary executive theorists considered unconstitutional. 7 In 1988, the
American Enterprise Institute held a conference on "The Fettered
Presidency,"' 8 which was later published as a book that began: "The office
of the president of the United States has been significantly weakened in
recent years and . . . Congress is largely, but not entirely, responsible."' 9
That same year, the Supreme Court rejected the Reagan administration's
claim that the Independent Counsel Act was unconstitutional-by a decisive
7-1 vote. 20 The decision was written by William Rehnquist, who as a law
clerk in the 1950s had objected to the centralizing excesses of President
Roosevelt.2' The only dissenter was Scalia, a former head of the OLC under
President Ford.22  The debate highlighted a generational divide:
conservatives who came of age during the New Deal era and its immediate
aftermath viewed the presidency as a harmful institution, while those who
came of age in the 1970s and 1980s viewed it as preferable to an
overreaching Congress.23
Born in 1936, Justice Kennedy straddled this generational divide.T 24 As
a young lawyer, he made his name lobbying and practicing private law in
Sacramento, 25 rather than practicing public law in Washington. His
worldview was not centrally shaped by the reaction to Watergate. And most
important, he has a more skeptical vision of executive power, and a more
romantic vision of the judiciary's duty to check executive excesses in order
to preserve longstanding liberties.
16. See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive,
Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 1153 (1992).
17. See Rosen, supra note 14, at 8.
18. See id. at 9.
19. Robert H. Bork, Foreword to THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY: LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH ix (L. Gordon Crovitz & Jeremy A. Rabkin eds., 1989).
20. See id. at 9 (referring to Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 659 (1988)).
21. See Rosen, supra note 14, at 9.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. See Oyez: Anthony M. Kennedy, U.S. Supreme Court Justice, http://www.oyez.org/
justices/anthonykennedy/.
25. See id.
These generational and intellectual divisions came to a head in the
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld case, decided in 2006.26 Although the Bush
Administration lost, one could trace in the Justices' opinions the evolution of
conservative thought on executive power over the past few decades.
Concurring with the majority, Justice Kennedy wrote that the
Administration's use of military tribunals in the war on terrorism "is not a
case ... where the Executive can assert some unilateral authority to fill a
void left by congressional inaction. It is a case where Congress,
in the proper exercise of its powers as an independent branch of
government . . .has . . .set limits on the President's authority. 27 Justice
Thomas, joined by Justices Scalia and Alito, filed a passionate dissent,
calling the idea that Congress could second-guess the President's authority
as Commander-in-Chief "antithetical to our constitutional structure. 28
The generational divide was telling: Kennedy represents an older wave
of conservatives who never served in the executive branch and who
associate the presidency with the liberal nationalizing excesses of the New
Deal and the Great Society. By contrast, the unitary executive proponents-
Thomas, Scalia, Alito, and possibly Chief Justice John Roberts (who recused
himself from this Supreme Court case because he had ruled against Hamdan
while on the D.C. Circuit)29-all served in the Ford or Reagan
Administrations. 30 And during that time, these Justices came to see a strong
presidency as the only way to defend conservative ideals from the
encroachments of a Democratic Congress, liberal courts, and obstreperous
bureaucrats.
In his majority opinion in Hamdan, Justice Stevens explicitly rejected
the Bush Administration's most extreme view of executive unilateralism.
Citing Justice Robert Jackson's famous opinion striking down President
Truman's effort to seize the steel mills in 1952, Justice Stevens declared,
"Whether or not the President has independent power, absent congressional
authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not disregard
limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers,
placed on his powers."31
Justice Stevens' vision of executive power was centrally shaped after
World War II when, as a law clerk to Justice Wiley Rutledge, he wrote or
26. Hamden v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
27. Id. at 2799 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 2823 (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia & Alito, JJ.).
29. See id. at 2758-59 (majority opinion). See also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 464 F. Supp. 2d 9, 10
(D.D.C. 2006).
30. The Justices of the Supreme Court, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/
bigoraphiescurrent.pdf (last visited Jan 17, 2008).
31. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774 n.23 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
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studied important dissents in which Justice Rutledge had questioned the
haste with which the Court endorsed procedurally dubious war crimes
trials. 32 In particular, Stevens worked with Rutledge on his dissent from a
1948 opinion upholding the right of the Attorney General to deport German
nationals he considered Nazis without any review by federal courts.
33
Stevens cited Rutledge's dissent when he wrote a landmark majority opinion
in the 2004 Rasul case, which allowed foreign nationals held at Guantanamo
Bay to challenge their detentions in United States courts.34
Stevens was also influenced by Rutledge's dissenting opinion in the
Yamashita case in 1946, where the Court upheld the power of a military
commission to try and execute a Japanese general in the Philippines in
violation of the Geneva Conventions. 35 Emphasizing the dangers of denying
anyone within American jurisdiction a fair trial, Stevens once again cited
Rutledge's dissent in Stevens' landmark opinion in the Hamdan case, which
Kennedy joined.36
Stevens continued to court Justice Kennedy in the deliberations about
whether to hear the most recent cases involving challenges to the Military
Commissions Act of 2006. Initially, both Stevens and Kennedy voted not to
hear the case, believing the litigants had not exhausted their congressionally
specified remedies; but in a joint statement respecting the denial of
certiorari, they quoted a concurring opinion by Justice Rutledge and stressed
that these people could not be made to run a gauntlet without end.37 But
later, Justices Kennedy and Stevens were persuaded that a gauntlet had been
established and run, and they voted together to hear the case.3"
Kennedy's view of executive power in domestic cases is similarly
committed to preserving liberty against what he perceives as executive
assaults. In his majority opinion in Gonzales v. Oregon, after all, he
objected to the idea that the Attorney General on his own could ban the use
32. See generally JOHN M. FERREN, SALT OF THE EARTH, CONSCIENCE OF THE COURT: THE
STORY OF JUSTICE WILEY RUTLEDGE 301-19 (2004).
33. Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 193-210 (1948) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
34. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 477 (2004) (citing Ahrens, 355 U.S. at 209 (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting)).
35. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1,41 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
36. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2796-97 (quoting In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 44 (1946) (Rutledge, J.,
joined by Murphy, J., dissenting).
37. Boumediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 1478, 1478 (2007) (statement by Justices Stevens and
Kennedy respecting denial of certiorari) (quoting Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 570 n. 12 (1947)
(Rutledge, J., concurring)).
38. See Bourmediene v. Bush, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007), granting cert., 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (No. 06-1195).
of prescription drugs to cause death-a regulation Congress itself had
refused to enact.39  Does this mean that Kennedy is a partisan of
congressional power vis-A-vis the executive? In Hamdan, he had suggested
that the executive's position would be entitled to greater weight if it were
endorsed by Congress.T 40  But Kennedy is no more a congressional
supremacist than an executive supremacist. He is a judicial supremacist.
It was Kennedy who, between 1994 and 2000, voted more frequently
than any other Justice to strike down federal and state laws.4' In his
sweeping rhetoric, insisting on not only the right, but also the duty of judges,
to reject congressional or executive pronouncements that infringe on the
judiciary's unique duty to say what the law is, he is the Court's most vocal
defender of judicial power.
This is good news in the short run for the liberals who seem to have a
fairly reliable ally in their effort to defend congressional prerogatives against
executive assaults. Whether the Justices of the Roberts Court will maintain
their positions on executive power when we have a new President, on the
other hand, remains to be seen.
50Q.1,0U
39. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270-72 (2006).
40. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799-800 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
41. THOMAS KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY 251 (2004).
